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Is “Monkeypox” A Threat, Accident/Covered Up, Or Illusion? As Restrictions Return It May Not Matter

Welcome to The Daily Wrap Up, a concise show dedicated to bringing you the most relevant independent news, as we see it, from the last 24 hours (5/22/22).

As always, take the information discussed in the video below and research it for yourself, and come to your own conclusions. Anyone telling you what the truth is, or claiming they have the answer, is likely leading you astray, for one reason or another. Stay Vigilant.



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Ryan Cristián
"Living is easy with eyes closed, misunderstanding all you see." - John Lennon Driven by a desire for accuracy, chef and independent news stalwart Ryan Cristián has a passion for the Truth. As a recent recipient of the Serena Shim Award For Uncompromising Integrity In Journalism, he understands that Americans want their news to be transparent, devoid of the opulence frothed out by today's corporate media. A cultured and insightful man with a worldly sense, Ryan's unjaded approach offers common sense to the individual racked by the ambiguous news cycle - a vicious and manipulative merry-go-round that keeps trenchant minds at a manageable distance from the truth. Avid writer & editor by day, Truth seeker by night, Ryan's reality defines what it means to be current.

12 Replies to “Is “Monkeypox” A Threat, Accident/Covered Up, Or Illusion? As Restrictions Return It May Not Matter

  1. Loved the start. I will add that I cringe every time I hear peer reviewed, used to suggest that this makes a paper/study honest or legitimate. Trolls on Facebook love to demand you show them a peer reviewed study to backup your posts.

    The Peer Review process is used to censor REAL science, to push narratives, and deceive, and get funding!

    Some reviewers are honest, and some studies/papers are reasoned….some.

    It is a big club. You give my non-science nonsense study a good review and I will do the same for you.

    Look back in history…..or yesterday even, and you find massive amounts of studies/papers “peer reviewed”, that were fraud or just nonsense.

  2. Ryan, didn’t you follow the logic of Dr. Kaufman? Why are you feigning ignorance as if there was a defined, identified, VIRUS of any kind? If you follow the logic carefully then you know we are being duped by every story that affirms the identity of ANY VIRUS.
    Virus stories are cover, cover, cover, cover….

  3. As far as I’m aware, the second ammendment of the us constitution is somewhat unique. With regards to the first ammendment: A lot of other countries say they have free speech but (i think), there’s actually some significant restrictions compared to the us (I’m talking about Europe, Canada, Australia).

    Other countries, like in Latin America, Africa, I think may have more free speech than in Europe, Australia and canada, probably with some exceptions (not sure). Asia probably less than Latin America and Africa.

    Anyway, point is, I do think America does have relatively unique free speech (on paper, at least).

    With regards to the right to bare arms, that I know of, America probably enshrines that in its constitution more than any other country.

    Not saying it’s the only place, like that guy does, but I am saying America is a huge piece for freedom on the world stage.

  4. A snippet from a study by Ralph Baric

    2006-07 Synthetic Viral Genomics: Risks and Benefits for Science and Society
    Ralph S. Baric University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
    A. VirusesandBiologicalWarfare
    Viral disease outbreaks have long inspired fear in human populations. Highly pathogenic infectious disease has shaped world history, primarily by impacting the outcome of wars and other global conflicts and precipitating human movement. Historic accounts have documented the catastrophic consequences and human suffering associated with widespread viral outbreaks like smallpox virus, yellow fever virus, measles virus, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV), the 1918 influenza virus and others (51). News accounts and film have reinforced the serious threat posed by the emergence of new viral diseases as well as the catastrophic consequences of intentional release of highly pathogenic viruses in human populations. As illustrated by the SARS epidemic and the continuing evolution of the H5N1 avian influenza, global and national infectious disease outbreaks can overwhelm disaster medical response networks and medical facilities, disrupt global economies, and paralyze health and medical services by targeting health care workers and medical staff (21). This review focuses on viruses of humans, animals and plants that are viewed as potential weapons of mass disruption to human populations, critical plant and animal food sources, and national economies; and will consider whether and how the availability of synthetic genomics technologies will change this landscape.
    Biological warfare (BW) agents are microorganisms or toxins that are intended to kill, injure or incapacitate the enemy, elicit fear and devastate national economies. Because small amounts of microorganisms might cause high numbers of casualties, they are classified as weapons of mass destruction. A number of naturally occurring viruses have potential uses as BW agents, although the availability of these agents is oftentimes limited. This report discusses the potential use of recombinant and synthetic DNAs to resurrect recombinant BW viruses de novo and the potential for altering the pathogenic properties of viruses for nefarious purposes. Examples of weaponized viruses include Variola major (Smallpox), Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEE), and the filoviruses Marburg and Ebola viruses, with the classic example being the use of smallpox virus-contaminated blankets against indigenous North American Indian populations (76). It is now clear that many viruses possess properties consistent with applications in biological warfare and bioterrorism.
    B. Properties of Select BW Agents
    Traditionally, biological warfare concerns have focused on a relatively limited, select group of naturally occurring pathogens viewed as having a set of desirable characteristics: 1) highly pathogenic, 2) readily available, 3) easily produced, 4) weaponizable, 5) stable, 6) infectious at a low dose, 7) easily transmissible, and 8) inspiring of fear (32). Viruses of concern include pathogens that replicate and produce serious morbidity and mortality in humans to pathogens that target farm animals and plants of economic importance. Historically, weaponization of agents has been constrained by availability, the biological characteristics specified within the genome of these organisms, the ability to replicate and produce large quantities of the material, and by the lack of appropriate associated technologies. Culture (growth) and containment conditions for most of the virus agents of concern have been solved and are readily available in the literature. Natural hosts and reservoirs of many viral agents have been identified, providing a means of readily acquiring these pathogens in nature, although this is not always the case. Most recently, full length genome sequences have been solved for many important human, animal and plant pathogens, providing a genetic template for understanding the molecular mechanisms of pathogenesis and replication. Structural studies have identified contact points between the virus and the host receptors needed for docking and entry, providing the means to humanize animal pathogens (42). With the advent of synthetic biology, recombinant DNA technology, reverse genetic approaches (i.e. the development of molecular clones of infectious genomes) and the identification of
    Synthetic Genomics: Risks and Benefits for Science and Society
    virulence alleles, not only are new avenues available for obtaining these pathogens, but more ominously, tools exist for simultaneously modifying the genomes for increased virulence, immunogenicity, transmissibility, host range and pathogenesis (22, 59). Moreover, these approaches can be used to molecularly resurrect extinct human and animal pathogens, like the 1918 human influenza virus (81).
    National biodefense strategies are focused on threats posed by this small group of plant, animal and human pathogens that occur in nature. However, counterterrorism think-tanks anticipate that these particular threats will ameliorate over the next decade because of medical countermeasures (e.g., drugs, vaccines, diagnostics), coupled with a limited set of pathogens that include all of the biological warfare characteristics. More important, the anticipated long-term threat in biological warfare is in recognizing and designing countermeasures to protect against genetically modified and designer pathogens, made possible by newly emerging technologies in recombinant DNA, synthetic biology, reverse genetics and directed evolution (59). How will synthetic genomics effect future biological weapons development? What are the risks and benefits of these new technologies and how serious a threat do they pose for human health and the global economy? This paper builds upon earlier work and seeks to review the methodologies in isolating recombinant viruses in vitro and the application of these methods globally to biological warfare and biodefense (27). …
    Page 38>>Group I viruses include the double-stranded DNA (dsDNA) viruses, like the Herpes viruses and Poxviruses which replicate in the nucleus or cytoplasm, respectively. The dsDNA viruses use cellular and/or virally-encoded transcriptase components to mediate expression of viral mRNAs. Poxviruses for instance require one or more viral proteins to initiate mRNA transcription and boot infectivity of the viral genome. Hence, smallpox virus genomes are not infectious unless the appropriate suite of viral proteins is provided in trans (in addition to the genome itself). In contrast, the Herpes virus genome is infectious in the absence of any viral proteins as cellular transcriptase machinery induces expression of early mRNAs and proteins that regulate expression of other viral genes and replication. Using vaccinia (poxvirus) as a model, an approach to successfully initiate/jump start and boot the infectivity of poxviruses has been developed, providing a template strategy for the family (11, 24). Herpes virus genomes are infectious in the absence of additional viral factors. Group II viruses encode single stranded DNA genomes which must be used as templates for the synthesis of a dsDNA before transcription and translation of mRNAs can occur within cells. At this time, group II BW agents have not been identified.
    The Group III viruses contain double stranded RNA viruses, like reoviruses. Reovirus genomes consist of complementary positive and negative strands of RNA that are bound by hydrogen bonding, wrapped within a multistructured icosahedral core that is essential for virus transcription. The virion structure contains the necessary proteins required for initiating mRNA synthesis. Unlike many of the single-stranded RNA viruses, the dsRNA virus genomes are not infectious in isolation and the components necessary for booting genome infectivity remain unresolved.
    Group IV viruses contain a single-stranded positive polarity RNA genome and include the flaviviruses, alphaviruses, picornaviruses (including poliovirus), coronaviruses (including the SARS virus), caliciviruses and others. Upon entry into cells, positive strand RNA genomes are immediately recognized by host translational machinery and the genome is translated into a suite of viral proteins, including the replicase proteins and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase which is necessary for initiating the viral replication cycle. Consequently, genome infectivity usually does require viral proteins or transcripts provided in trans to boot genome infectivity, although some exceptions have been reported (13). Group V viruses contain a single-stranded negative polarity RNA genome and include filoviruses (Ebola/Marburg), myxoviruses (influenza), and paramyxoviruses (Hendra). Group V genomes come in two different flavors, segmented (e.g., myxoviruses) or nonsegmented (e.g., paramyxoviruses and filoviruses). In either case, the genome is not infectious because it is complementary in sequence (anti-sense); it is the opposite of the positive strand that specifies amino acids and thus cannot be translated directly into any of the critical viral structural or replicase proteins needed for producing infectious virions. Negative strand RNA genomes are encapsidated into a complex ribonucleoprotein structure (RNP) usually composed of several virally encoded replicase proteins (e.g., polymerase complex proteins, support proteins, trans-acting proteins) that are incorporated into the virion during assembly. Together, these compose a functional replication complex. Upon entry, these RNP complexes immediately transcribe the genome negative strand RNA into mRNA that can be translated into the viral proteins.
    Consequently, genome infectivity requires the presence of full length RNA and a set of virally encoded replicase proteins that function as a transcriptional complex to express mRNAs. If mRNAs encoding the transcripton complex are provided in trans, group V genomes become infectious and virus will be successfully recovered.
    Group VI viruses, retroviruses (including HIV) and lentiviruses, encode single stranded positive polarity RNA genomes, but virions encode a reverse transcriptase enzyme to convert the mRNA genome into a complementary DNA (cDNA) which serves as template for dsDNA synthesis. Following the synthesis of dsDNA, group VI viruses use cellular transcriptional and translational machinery to express viral transcripts encoding structural and nonstructural proteins. At this time, the group VI viruses do not include any BW agents. …
    The basic concepts central to understanding virus reverse genetics and molecular clones are summarized in Figures 1 and 2. The central idea is that the virion is an extracellular vehicle that transfers the viral genome (e.g., RNA or DNA genomes) between susceptible cells and protects the nucleic acid genome from degradation in the environment (Figure 2, Part A). Following entry, the viral genome is programmed to initiate a series of events that result in the production of a replicase complex that transcribes mRNA and replicates the genome. As discussed in the previous section, nucleic acid structure and organization determines the pathway of events needed to express mRNA and initiate virus gene expression and infection. Not all viruses, however, require virion attachment and entry to mediate a productive infection. In these cases, viral genomes can be isolated from virions and transfected directly into susceptible host’s cells. If the genome is infectious, viral RNAs and proteins will be expressed allowing for the production and release of progeny virions (Figure 2, Part B). Classic examples of viruses with “infectious genomes” include the herpes viruses, polioviruses, alphaviruses, polyomaviruses, and flaviviruses which are classified among the Group I, II or IV viruses. However, not all viral genomes are infectious upon delivery into cells. Viruses with Group III or V genomes have never been demonstrated to be infectious upon genome delivery into susceptible cells. Some Group I (poxviruses) and group IV virus genomes (e.g., norovirus, a causative agent of non-bacterial gastroenteritis, or “cruise ship disease” and the coronavirus infectious bronchitis virus) are not infectious upon delivery into susceptible cells (13). In these instances, genome infectivity requires the presence of specific cofactors to initiate viral replication. These cofactors typically represent one or more proteins that encode essential replicase proteins or encapsidate the genome into an RNP structure necessary for initiating transcription of mRNA from the genome.
    Generation of infectious clones for viruses encoding large RNA or DNA genomes is complicated by the need for sequence accuracy (e.g., incorrect sequences usually contain lethal mutations), the lack of suitable cloning vectors that stably maintain large DNA inserts, large genome size, and that the genomes oftentimes encode regions that are toxic or unstable in bacteria. In poxviruses for example, the ~200 kilobase pair (kbp) genome has covalently closed hairpin ends (structures formed by the DNA itself) that are required for genome replication and virion encoded products are also essential for booting genome infectivity (24).
    Herpes virus genomes are ~150 kbp in size. One solution was to stably clone large viral genomes as bacterial artificial chromosome (BAC) vectors. BAC vectors are based on the replication of F factor in E.coli, which is tightly controlled and allows stable maintenance of large, complex DNA fragments up to 600 kbp and both herpesvirus and poxvirus genomes can be stably maintained in BAC vectors (17, 24).

  5. Hey Ryan,

    Thanks for all your great work and dedication. You and your dog are in my mind and thoughts as you go through this difficult time. I love dogs as well. We are here for you

  6. Sorry, Baby Formula wasn’t air-dropped as humanitarian aid, ….. it was Bought And Paid For out of desperation to save face (Bribem)

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